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[V E R YP R E L I M I N A R Y]
Abstract
I develop and estimate a heterogeneous agents business cycle model featuring aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks on the one hand, collateralized and uncollateralized debt on the other. I use the model
to ask two sets of questions: (1) what has caused the large increase in private debt over GDP in the
U Si nt h el a s t3 0y e a r s ? (2) can the model account for some features of the distribution of assets and
expenditure across the population?
In answer to (1), I ﬁnd that most of the increase in private debt can be explained by a rise in the
volatility of idiosyncratic shocks (coupled with the unit root behavior of idiosyncratic debt itself). In
response to (2), I ﬁnd that the model developed can explain not only the trend but also the cyclical
behavior of ﬁnancial assets over time, as well as the dynamics in earnings and consumption inequality
which are found in the data. (JEL E31, E32, E44, E52, R21)
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This phenomenon has occurred alongside two separate and striking changes in economic volatility. On the
one hand, aggregate volatility has fallen: in the US, the standard deviation of GDP growth has roughly
halved between the period 1960-1983 and the period 1983-2002. On the other, cross-sectional risk has
risen, as well as earnings inequality between and within income groups.
This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model to understand the interaction between the
interaction between income volatility, private sector ﬁnancial balances, and the distribution of consump-
tion. In detail, I construct a three-agents general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic income shocks,
aggregate income shocks and ﬁnancial shocks and ask whether the model helps replicating the historical
behavior of ﬁnancial assets in the US in the last three decades. In particular, I address the following
questions:
1. What has caused the rise in debt? Does the increase in borrowing reﬂect the response of agents to
easing liquidity constraints, the reduction in aggregate uncertainty or the rise in individual income
volatility?
2. Does the causality running from the primitive shocks to the quantity of debt feeds back into the
observed macroeconomic volatility?
The key model features are heterogeneity in discount rates, market incompleteness (in the form
of liquidity constraints for some of the agents), idiosyncratic income shocks and ﬁnancial shocks. Three
agents populate the economy: they issue bonds, produce a ﬁnal good using capital and labor and consume
durables and non-durables. Agents 1 and 2 only diﬀer in their idiosyncratic productivity. Idiosyncratic
shocks give rise to a desire to borrow and lend. Agent 3 also diﬀers in preferences: being more impatient,
agent 3 would like to borrow at the equilibrium interest rate. This agent faces borrowing constraints tied
to durable values. Changes in the tightness of borrowing constraints aﬀect how much agent 3 borrows
from 1 and 2.
Using annual data on between and within-group incomei n e q u a l i t y ,Ie s t i m a t es t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s sf o r
the idiosyncratic income shocks; using data on loan-to-value ratios and productivity, I estimate processes
for “ﬁnancial” shocks and aggregate productivity shocks. Once the shocks are estimated, I simulate the
model to test whether the timing of the shocks can explain the patterns in the data, in particular the
trend and the cyclical behavior of private debt, and the distribution of consumption and income across
the population.
The key ﬁnding of the paper lies in the ability of a heterogeneous agents model to explain at the same
time two salient feature of the data:
1. On the one hand, the model can explain the timing and the magnitude of rise in private debt over
GDP. Debt rises when the cross-sectional risk increases and when borrowing constraints become
2looser. Of the total variation in debt, a large fraction is due to increased idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty, and a smaller one to ﬁnancial liberalization (time variation in the tightness of the borrowing
constraints).
2. On the other, the model can reconcile the sharp increase in income inequality over the last 30 years
with a modest rise in consumption inequality over the same time period.
1T h e m o d e l
1.1 Overview
There are three agents. Each agent works, produces and accumulates assets over time. The mass of each
set of agents is normalized to 1. Absent shocks, patient agents only diﬀer in their total productivity:
hence within-group diﬀerences between them can be ascribed to some exogenous, unobservable ﬁxed
eﬀect. Impatient agents diﬀer from patient agents along two key dimensions: they discount the future
more heavily, and they face borrowing constraints which limit the amount of assets they can trade in
order to smooth consumption. I refer to diﬀerences between impatient and patient agents as between-group
diﬀerences. I now describe the behavior of each agent.
1.2 Patient Agent 1
Each agent in the economy is subject to an aggregate productivity shock and to an idiosyncratic shock to
its own productivity. For each agent, the production function used to produce output y combines capital
k and labor l through a standard constant returns to scale technology. The resulting output can be either
consumed, invested in business capital k (which depreciates at rate δk) or in durables / housing capital
h (which depreciates at rate δh and provides utility services).
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where b0
t are loans made by agent 1 to the impatient agent 3, whose behavior will be described below,
and d is borrowing of agent 1 from agent 2.
1The preferences here are consistent with balanced growth. See King and Rebelo (1999).
3In the production function, At reﬂects aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), which is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process in logs. Shocks to TFP are perfectly correlated across all agents. To capture
secular growth in output, I assume that there is a deterministic component to productivity Xt which is
assumed to expand at a constant rate over time. That is:
Xt =( 1+g)Xt−1.
Finally, Wt and Zt reﬂect instead idiosyncratic shocks (which are assumed to follow AR(1) processes
in logs). Shocks to Wt only aﬀect the productivity of patient agents and are negatively correlated across
agents: given that patient agents are identical except that for the scale A of their production function,
shocks to Wt can be interpreted as a source of within-group income volatility. Conversely, shocks to Zt
aﬀect all agents: when these shocks hit positively the patient agents, they also hit negatively the impatient
agents: such shocks can be interpreted as a source of between-group income inequality.
In addition, for the generic bond i, I also assume a trading cost of the form:
φi
t = φ
(it − (1 + g)it−1)
2
2Xt




































































































I assume that these agents’ asset position is such that the borrowing constraints that they face are
never binding. This assumption is safe if their wealth is large enough of if their maximum borrowing
limit is large enough relative to their wealth.
1.3 Patient agent 2
Patient agens 2 are indexed by a double prime (00). They are identical to agent 1, except for the scale of
their production function (in steady state, this is chosen so as to match observed within-income inequality
in the data). These agents can lend (borrow) dt (−dt) to patient agent 1 and can lend b00
t to impatient















4The parameters θ and γ are chosen in a way to guarantee that, keeping capital and labor input ﬁxed,
t h ea g g r e g a t ee ﬀect of given idiosyncratic shocks Zt and Wt are zero (the restrictions on θ and γ will be
derived in the next section).
1.4 Impatient agent 3
Impatient agents are assumed to discount the future more heavily than agents 1 and 2 and to face a
liquidity constraint that limits the amount of borrowing to their durable assets. With this very simple
assumption, I want to capture the idea that durables can be used as a form of collateral.











subject to the following budget constraint, where b0 and b00 denote respectively borrowing from patient
agent 1 and patient agent 2:




t−1 + kt − (1 − δk)kt−1 + φb0
t + φb00








and the borrowing constraints are respectively:
b0
t <α m tht/Rt (9)
b00
t < (1 − α)mtht/R00
t.( 1 0 )
In the borrowing constraint, α is the fraction of collateral which is pledged respectively to each of the
two agents. Since any value of α maximizes the borrowing capacity of the agent, I set α to be equal to
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It is straightforward to show that, in a neighborhood of the steady state, agent 3 will be borrowing
constrained and the multiplier λ on the borrowing constraint will be stricly positive.2
2See Iacoviello (forthcoming) for a related application.
51.5 Markets and equilibrium
The deﬁnition of equilibrium is standard. In equilibrium, all the markets clear and the interest rates
work to equate demand and supply in the goods market and in the market for bonds.
1.6 The shocks, and how to measure them
The economy is hit by four shocks: an aggregate productivity shock, a ﬁnancial shock, and two types of
idiosyncratic shocks hitting diﬀerently the diﬀerent agents in the economy.
It is instructive to think of the two patient/unconstrained agents as otherwise identical agents. Shocks
to the income of one relative to the other are therefore a source of within-group earnings inequality in
the population. Instead, shocks to the income of constrained agents relative to the unconstrained agents
are a source of between-group earnings inequality.
I extract measures of the shocks from the data as follows: I take a total measure of income inequality
over time (broken down by within-group and between-group) and recover from such measure the time
series for the idiosyncratic shocks. The next section explain this procedure in more detail.
2 Recovering idiosyncratic shocks from earnings inequality
2.1 The data
Several papers have documented upward trends in income inequality in the US in the last 30 years
(see for instance Kats and Autor, 1999, and Moﬃtt and Gottschalk, 2002). I follow common practice
and decompose the overall income distribution3 into diﬀerences in wages between groups (deﬁned by
skill, demographic or observable categories) and within group wage dispersion (residual wage inequality,
measuring the eﬀect of unobservables).
Krueger and Perri (2003), among the others, document the levels and the trends of the above variables.
Disposable earnings variance was 36% in 1970, and had risen to about 53% in 2000. Between and within
variances were respectively 4% and 32% in 1970, and 8% and 45% in 2000. They also document another
important piece of information: consumption inequality only rises by a small amount throughout the
same period, mostly driven by an increase in between-group consumption inequality.
3Since labor income is 2/3 of total income earned, I refer for now to earnings-wage-income inequality interchangeably.
Future work should relax this assumption.
62.2 The methodology: within (w) and between-group (z) variance
Setting aside time variations in labor and capital input, total factor and deterministic productivity,4 I
can write the agents’ log income processes as
logyt =l o g y0 +l o gzt
logy0
t =l o g y1 − logwt − ζ logzt
logy00
t =l o g y2 + θlogwt − γ logzt
log(z) and log(w) are shocks which are normalized to zero in period 0. By deﬁnition, I want the shocks
to satisfy the following conditions:
1. Idiosyncratic shocks must be such that total income would be unchanged keeping hours and capital
input constant. It is easy to show that this implies the following restrictions on θ, γ and ζ:
θ = y1/y2
y0 = ζy1 + γy2
2. Idiosyncratic shocks must be such that between-group zt shocks do not aﬀect within group log



















3. Given these conditions, once within group shocks are calculated, between group shocks will be
extracted as the residual consistent with conditions (1) and (2).
2.3 Within-group log variance
Within-group variance measures inequality between patient agent 1 and agent 2, who otherwise have same
preferences. I am interested in recovering a time series for their income shock logwt which is consistent
with known observations about time variations in the within group log-income variance Vw, which is
observable from the data. At each point in time, within group variance is given by:
Vwt =
(logy1 − logwt − EH)
2 +( l o gy2 + θlogwt − EH)
2
3
4By this, I mean that these terms are all subsumed into the constants Y0,Y 1 and Y2.
7where EH = 1
2 (logy1 +l o gy2 − (1 − θ)logwt). At time zero, all shocks are normalized to zero, so that






Simple algebra can be shown to derive vector of shock processes which is consistent with given observations










Between-group variance measures inequality between log income of the impatient agent and the mean










(logy1 − logwt +l o gy2 + θlogwt) − E
¶2!
where E = 1





(2logy0 − logy1 − logy2 +2( 1+γ)logz +( 1− θ)logw)
2 .













18Vb − (1 − θ)logw
´
where γ depends on the initial steady state.
2.5 Initial steady state
In the initial steady state of the model, w0 =0and z0 =0 . Hence I set:
logy2 =l o gy1 +
p
6Vw0
so that within group variance replicates the value found in the data. Analogously, in order to replicate
between group inequality, I set:









83 Calibration and simulation
To check whether the model can account for the main stylized facts, I use the following procedure:
1. I calibrate the structural parameters of the model, so that the initial steady state matches key
observations of the US economy in the year 1969. In detail, I set the parameters describing pref-
erences and technology so that in the initial steady state the debt to GDP ratio, the ratios of the
components of spending to output and the distribution of income replicate the data.
2. I estimate from the data the sequence of technology shocks, ﬁnancial shocks and between and
within-group income shocks.
3. I feed the estimated shocks into the model decision rules (calculated under the assumption that the
shocks that hit the economy are drawn by the same distribution from which the decision rules are
calculated) starting from the year 1969, and check whether the time series generated from the model
can replicate the cyclical and trend behavior of ﬁnancial assets, income inequality and consumption
inequality.
3.1 Calibration
The time period is set equal to one year. This reﬂect the lack of higher frequency measures of income
inequality over time, which are needed to recover the processes for the idiosyncratic shocks.
Table 3.1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. As explained above, these parameters are meant
to capture the initial (year 1969) steady state distribution of income and ﬁnancial assets, as well as
the consumption, business ﬁxed and housing investment to output ratios. Given that patient agents do
not face borrowing constraints, their discount factor (together with the deterministic growth rate of the
economy g, which is estimated to be 1.6 percent per annum) pins down the steady state real interest rate
at 3% per year.
In this version, the cost of bond transactions is assumed to be small for all agents. Labor supply
elasticity is assumed to be 1/η =1 /3, a number which is in the range of microeconometric estimates of
labor supply elasticity.5 The capital share µ and the housing preferences parameter j are chosen so as
the match the steady state stocks and ﬂow of structures and investment which are found in the data. It
is assumed that housing depreciates more slowly than business capital. The discount factor for impatient
a g e n t si sa s s u m e dt ob e0.9 (see Iacoviello (forthcoming) for a discussion).
In the aggregate, these choices result in 29% ﬁxed investment over output ratio, 4% housing investment
output ratio, 67% non-durable consumption output ratio. These data are roughly consistent with US
post-world war II experience.
5See for instance Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999).
9β =0 .9
β0 = β00 =0 .985
µ =0 .33
j = j0 = j00 =0 .1
δk =0 .1
δh =0 .01









Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameter Values
In order to match income variability in the data, I pick (A,A0,A 00) so as to match cross-sectional
income volatility at the beginning of the sample. In particular, the values of A’s are chosen so that in
the initial steady state y =1 ,y 0 =0 .77 and y00 =3 .03. These values imply that moving from the initial
steady state, a relative increase in y00 (coming from positive shocks to Wt)v e r s u sy0 leads to an increase
in within-group income inequality, whereas a relative increase in y (coming from positive shocks to Zt)
versus y0 and y00 leads to a decrease in between-group income inequality.
In addition, at the beginning of the sample period, total debt over GDP is 91%.I p i c k a t y p i c a l
loan-to-value ratio m = 75% at the beginning of sample period. This results in a ratio of collateralized
debt to output of 25%. The unconstrained debt cannot be pinned uniquely down in the steady state of
the model, however we can choose it so that total debt matches its beginning of period value: that is,
unconstrained debt is chosen to be 91% − 25% = 66%. A ﬁnal decision has to be made as to whether
patient agent 1 or patient agent 2 is a borrower or a lender. Since in the data I observe an increase in
debt over time alongside an increase in within-group income inequality over time, it is self-evidence that
the model can explain a rise in debt only if the poorer agent is a borrower at the beginning of the sample
period. This is also consistent with the basic stylized facts that show how rich agents have, in general,
higher saving rates (see for instance Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes, 2004).
3.2 Stochastic processes for income and ﬁnancial liberalization
The stochastic processes for the shocks are calculated as follows:
101. I measure the technology shock from the BLS Manufacturing Multifactor Productivity Series. To
decompose this series into deterministic trend and stochastic cycle, I ﬁt a linear trend to this series
to extract γ, the deterministic productivity component. The residual from this regression is then
assumed to follow an AR(1) process and used to construct log(At).T h a ti s ,
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + eAt
where eAt is veriﬁed to be iid over time.6
2. The ﬁnancial shock / ﬁnancial liberalization measure is perhaps the hardest to construct. Likely
candidates would include:
1. observed measures of loan-to-value ratios: these are available from the Federal Reserve Federal
Housing Board (see http://www.fhfb.gov/mirs/mirs_downloads.htm). These are also readily
identiﬁable from the data;
2. measures of housing aﬀordability (see www.realtor.org);
3. measures of home ownership rates (see www.census.gov);
4. measures of the ability of banks to recover loans.
In reality, ﬁnancial liberalization in the United States has been a combination of (1) increased
credit market access and (2) increase in loan-to-value ratios. All these elements have occurred
through a variety of channels and it is impossible to expect that the time variation in mt can
capture much of this.
Therefore, any measure entirely based on (a) is likely to underestimate the growth in credit
due to ﬁnancial liberalization. For now, I simply take loan-to-price ratios as a measure of
ﬁnancial shocks and assume that they vary stochastically over time according to an AR(1)
process. This way, I can construct a measure of time-varying liquidity constraints, which gives
me the process for log(mt).
3. The idiosyncratic shock processes are calculated using the methods described above.
Figure 1 shows the time series for the shock processes constructed normalized to 0 in the 1969, which
is taken to be the base year. The increase in Wt over time reﬂects an increase in within group income
inequality, since income of patient agent 2 (who starts richer) rises over time at the expense of income
of agent 1. The decrease in Zt over time reﬂect instead a decline over time of the income share of the
impatient agents, which feeds back into a widening between group income inequality. For log(m), log(w),
6See King and Rebelo (1999) for details. I use the Manufacturing Multifactor Productivity (MFP). This is the most
widely reported measure of technical change, also referred to in other contexts as total factor productivity or the Solow
residual.
11log(z) and log(A) the autocorrelations are found to be respectively ρm =0 .78, ρw =0 .95, ρz =0 .98,
ρA =0 .82. It is interesting to notice how idiosyncratic shocks are very estimated to be very persistent:
trivially, the high persistence of these shocks reﬂects the extremely high persistence in the movements in
income inequality.7
4 Evidence on the behavior of the model
4.1 Impulse Responses
Figure 2 shows the basic workings of the model, by showing the impulse responses of the variables to
each of the shocks constructed above.
The key message of the impulse responses of Figure 2 is that even purely idiosyncratic shocks can
have aggregate eﬀects by causing heterogeneous responses of investment and labor supply on part of the
diﬀerent agents.
4.2 Model simulations
I start with the ﬁndings which are “too dependent” on the properties of the estimated shocks to be taken
as a serious measure of the success of the model in explaining the data.
4.2.1 You get what you put into it
• The model captures the behavior of GDP over the last 30 years
Remember that GDP (as well as all other trending variables) has been detrended with the linear
trend extracted from the multifactor productivity processes. As shown from Figure 3, the remaining
cyclical component moves together with the model counterpant. This is not surprising, since GDP
behavior is mostly driven by the exogenous technology shock, something which is well known in the
real business cycle literature (see for instance King and Rebelo, 1999).
• The model captures the evolution of income inequality over the last 30 years.
Income inequality is mainly driven by the idiosyncratic shocks and by the heterogeneous responses
in capital and hours worked from the agents. So long as labor supply is not too elastic and given the
small share of ﬁxed capital in production, it is not surprising that the model replicates the behavior
of between and within income inequality extremely well. See the top two panels of Figure 4.
7Krueger and Perri (2004) retrieve the persistence of the idiosyncratic income processes by estimating income processes
for classes of individuals in the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Their measure of persistence (see Table 1) is the second
largest eigenvalue of a transition matrix and cannot be directly compared to ours.
124.2.2 The success stories of the model
1. The model captures the trend behavior of debt over GDP.
In the data, debt over GDP rises in the data from 90% to 165%. In the model, it rises from 90% to
a very similar magnitude. See top-left panel of Figure 5.
2. The model captures the cyclical behavior of debt.
See the bottom panels of Figure 5. I do so by comparing the ﬁrst diﬀerence of log debt in the model
and in the data. The correlation coeﬃcient between the two is positive and diﬀerent from zero.
3. The model predicts a modest rise of consumption inequality, as found in the data, despite the strong
increase in income inequality.
As in the data, I ﬁnd that the model predicts a modest rise in within-group consumption inequality,8
while it also predicts a sharper increase in between-group inequality (see the bottom-right panel
of Figure 4). However, unlike in Krueger and Perri (2003) model, the result needs not to rely on
endogenous developments in the credit markets.
4. The model attributes most of the increase in debt to idiosyncratic volatility, in particular to within
group shocks.
This is shown in the top-right panel of Figure 5.
Of the increase in debt over GDP, a huge fraction is due to increased idiosyncratic volatility. This
might appear at ﬁrst sight surprising, since one is led to believe that all the debt claims issued by
agent 1 and 2 refer to unsecured debt. In fact, this debt might well be backed by collateral: the
model speciﬁcation simply assumes that for these agents wealth holdings are large enough that the
collateral constraint is never binding.
Thus point raises in fact one thorny issue for the model. At the beginning of the sample period,
agents balance sheets and ﬁnancial positions (relative to their incomes) are as follows (notice that
positive values of d or b indicate a debt):
y c/y h/y k/y d/y b/y (d + b)/y
Impatient agent 10 .77 1.40 1.55 0 1.09 1.09
Patient agent 1 0.77 0.59 1.52 2.74 4.33 −0.29 4.03
Patient agent 2 3.03 0.66 1.70 2.74 −1.09 −0.29 −1.38
Aggregate economy 0.67 1.61 2.49 0 0 0
8Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004) argue against the evidence shown by Krueger and Perri (2003), suggesting
that within-group consumption inequality has risen in the last 30 years. See also Attanasio and Davis (1996).
13Hence, at the beginning of the sample period, even the most indebted agents (patient 1) have
enough assets, in the form of housing and business capital, to make up for most of the debt. In a
sense, therefore, their net worth is still positive. Over the simulation period, as they pile up debt
faster than net worth, their net worth becomes slightly negative, so one can imagine that they are
forced to rely on “unsecured” debt to ﬁnance their negative idiosyncratic shocks, something which
seems to be entirely consistent with the recent US experience.9
5 Conclusions
The paper which is most closely related to mine is Krueger and Perri (2003).10 They argue that, in
the data, consumption inequality has risen much less than income inequality. They present a model
of endogenous market incompleteness in which the incentive to trade assets is directly related to the
uncertainty faced at the individual level. They show that only such a model is able to predict a modest
decrease in within-group consumption inequality alongside an increase in between-group consumption
inequality.
In my model, the increase in standard deviation of log consumption within groups is very small. My
overall results of a modest rise consumption inequality are also in line with the ﬁndings of, among the
others, Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004).
From the methodological point of view, the main element of novelty of my paper lies in its ability
to show how a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents can provide a
careful and sensitive description of trends not only of income over time, but also of the distribution of
consumption and holdings of ﬁnancial assets across the population. In addition, I focus not only on
consumption, but also on durables and on the behavior of ﬁnancial assets. Moreover, I retrieve the
actual shocks and feed them in the model, in order to see whether the model can explain not only the
trend but also the cyclical behavior of consumption, income and ﬁnancial assets. Understanding the
cyclical behavior of consumption and income inequality can provide better evidence of the success and
the relative merits of diﬀerent business cycle theories in explaining the evolution of ﬁnancial assets and
macroeconomic variables over time.
9See discussion in Sullivan (2004).
10See also the work by Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), although their main focus is on collateralized debt.
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15Appendix A: The steady state
Deﬁne variables with a bar on them the variables normalized by X. That is, c/X = c,y/X = y and so on...
Let ζ# be constants which depend on the structural parameters, and let ϕ#’s be constants which are functions of ζ#’s
and structural parameters. Normalize the τ so that l = l
0 = l
00 =1 .L e t d
0 = d>0 (double prime agent lends to single
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d = ϕ1y0 + ϕ2y − ϕd1d











00 + ϕ4y + ϕd2d
This set of equations oﬀers a complete characterization of the steady state.
16Appendix B: The linearized model
In the initial steady state only labor supply and interest rates are constant, whereas all the other variables grow at a constant
rate given by g. The model below is written in terms of the variables scaled by X, the deterministic productivity component.


















00 - Shocks mwzA
The state equations (let ω = m(β
0 − β),w h =
1−δh
1+g ,w k =
1−δk
1+g , e ∆ht = ht − whht−1)
yt = At + zt + µkt−1 +( 1− µ)lt (1)
y
0
t = At + wt − γ0zt + µk
0





t = At − α0wt − γ0zt + µk
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YY t = CCt + K (Kt − wkKt−1)+H (Ht − whHt−1) (6)






















































































ct = −(1 − βwk)(yt+1 − kt)+ct+1 (10)
yt = ct +( 1+η)lt (11)
b
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FIGURE 1: The estimated stochastic processes 
 






































Notes:  The variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state, which is 
taken to be the year 1969. 




















































































































































































Notes: Vertical axis measures percent deviations from steady state. FIGURE 3: Comparison between model and data: simulated income 
 


































 FIGURE 4: Simulated profiles of consumption and income inequality 
 
 










































FIGURE 5: Simulated profiles of debt 
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